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The behaviors of various confidence/credible interval constructions are explored, particularly in
the region of low event numbers where methods diverge most. We highlight a number of challenges,
such as the treatment of nuisance parameters, and common misconceptions associated with such
constructions. An informal survey of the literature suggests that confidence intervals are not always
defined in relevant ways and are too often misinterpreted and/or misapplied. This can lead to
seemingly paradoxical behaviors and flawed comparisons regarding the relevance of experimental
results. We therefore conclude that there is a need for a more pragmatic strategy which recognizes
that, while it is critical to objectively convey the information content of the data, there is also a
strong desire to derive bounds on model parameter values and a natural instinct to interpret things
this way. Accordingly, we attempt to put aside philosophical biases in favor of a practical view to
propose a more transparent and self-consistent approach that better addresses these issues.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to distill experimental results in a form rel-
evant to theoretical models is fundamental to scientific
inquiry. Yet the best approach for this is still a matter of
considerable discussion and debate. At the heart of the
issue is the desire to both objectively quantify results in a
frequentist manner and also draw relevant inferences for
specific models, which inherently requires a Bayesian con-
text (i.e. a choice of prior) for those models. A failure to
satisfactorily address both of these aspects has, in many
cases, led to misinterpretation and misapplication that
have not been mitigated by the adoption of new frequen-
tist conventions. The impact is largest for experiments
working in the region of low numbers of signal events,
where different approaches diverge most. The confusion
is not helped by the use of forms for the display of fre-
quentist information that seem to suggest direct bounds
on model parameter values or relative experimental sensi-
tivities to such models, neither of which is necessarily the
case. Suggestions that such confusion arises from ques-
tions that should not be asked concerning models are not
satisfactory and fail to confront the fact that scientists
do, in fact, ask such questions and should therefore make
use of the appropriate formalism for these.
In fact, the goals of both objectively conveying the
relevant information content of data and deriving bounds
on model parameter values are not mutually exclusive,
but rather are closely linked. It is not generally possible
to translate experimental results into meaningful model
constraints without specifying a prior. As such, detailed
objective information should be used to clearly define the
context for Bayesian constraints. The issue is therefore
largely one of establishing relevance and transparency.
In this paper, we briefly review the nature of various in-
terval constructions; highlight some apparent paradoxes
that arise from common misinterpretations; cite specific
cases where experiments have run into such issues; dis-
cuss several aspects associated with practical implemen-
tation; and, finally, propose an approach to directly ad-
dress the above issues in a more relevant, self-consistent
and transparent manner using standard techniques.
INTERVAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR
MEANING
Bayesian
Bayesian probabilities quantify the degree of belief in a
hypothesis. Given a measurement, the goal of a Bayesian
approach is to assign probabilities to the range of possible
model parameter values. By necessity, this requires an
assumed context for these models (prior), as indicated by
Bayes’ Theorem:
P (Hi|D) = P (D|Hi)P (Hi)∑
j
P (D|Hj)P (Hj) (1)
where P (Hi|D) is the posterior probability of hypothe-
sis Hi given the data D; P (D|Hi) is the likelihood of
the data assuming hypothesis Hi; and P (Hi) is the prior
probability for Hi that defines the a priori context rela-
tive to other model parameter values. The ratio between
Bayesian probabilities therefore provides an estimate of
relative “betting odds” for which hypotheses are most
likely to be correct.
For a purely Bayesian approach, there is no relevance
of the concept of “statistical coverage” of a credible in-
terval (the frequency with which a large number of rep-
etitions of an experiment subject to random fluctuations
ar
X
iv
:1
40
5.
50
10
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.da
ta-
an
]  
3 F
eb
 20
15
2would yield intervals that bound the correct hypothesis),
since no comparison is done to a hypothetical ensemble
— only the actual measurements matter. If desired, the
effective statistical coverage can often still be estimated
for Bayesian constructions using Monte Carlo calcula-
tions etc. (as shown in Appendix A), but the credibility
level that defines the construction simply relates the ac-
tual observation directly to the model.
Bayesian credible intervals are simply defined by the
relevant portion of the posterior probability density func-
tion (PDF) that constitutes a fraction equal to a pre-
defined credibility for the interval, CI. The way this
fraction is selected may be altered to yield lower bounds,
upper bounds, central intervals, the most compact inter-
val, or intervals containing the highest probability densi-
ties. For intervals, as opposed to bounds, we suggest that
using the highest probability density offers the most in-
tuitive and robust definition for an arbitrary probability
distribution.
As a simple example, we give the construction for an
upper bound (i.e. the critical value up to which integra-
tion is performed) on an average signal strength, S, in
a Poisson counting experiment where the expected back-
ground level is B and a total of n events is observed:
∫ Sup
0
[(S +B)ne−(S+B)/n!]P (S)dS∫∞
0
[(S +B)ne−(S+B)/n!]P (S)dS
= CI (2)
where Sup is the upper bound to be determined, P (S) is
the prior probability for S, and CI is the desired credibil-
ity for the interval. In the case where all positive values
of S are a priori given equal consideration (i.e. a uni-
form prior in which P (S) is a constant for S ≥ 0), this
can be shown, by repeated integrations by parts, to be
equivalent to:
∑n
m=0(Sup +B)
me−(Sup+B)/m!∑n
m=0B
me−B/m!
= 1− CI. (3)
Thus, Sup can be interpreted as denoting the upper
limit on the range of model parameter values for which
the probability of observing n events or less is not more
than 1 − CI, given that the possible number of back-
ground events cannot be greater than the total number
of events observed in this measurement. If a non-uniform
prior were used instead, the form would be modified and
the interpretation would be that the upper limit is on
the correspondingly weighted range of model parameter
values.
Standard Frequentist
Frequentist probabilities are defined as the relative
frequencies of occurrence given a hypothetical ensemble
of similar experiments subject to random fluctuations.
There is no such thing as a “probability” for a model pa-
rameter to lie within derived bounds — either it does or
it does not. However, if everyone derived bounds in the
same way, the correct model would be correctly bounded
a known fraction of the time (for more on statistical cov-
erage, see Appendix A).
Rather than using the posterior probability, the Ney-
man construction of frequentist intervals [1] starts with
the probability density function (PDF) for a given ob-
servation under a fixed hypothesis that is used to con-
struct the likelihood. For each possible hypothesis, a
portion of the possible outcomes containing the fraction
CL (frequentist confidence level) is defined. The range of
model parameter values for which a given measurement
is “likely” (i.e. would be contained within that CL frac-
tion) then defines the confidence region. Note that this
is not the same as a statement that any given model is
likely (which is Bayesian) and, indeed, the construction is
such as to avoid any direct comparison of models. How-
ever, as before, there is an ambiguity in this construction
regarding how the PDF is used to compose the initial fre-
quency intervals, with common ordering choices includ-
ing central, highest probability density and most compact
intervals. We will define frequentist approaches that use
an ordering principle based on the expected frequency of
observations for a given hypothesis as “standard frequen-
tist.” Approaches that fall outside of this include those
that use a likelihood ratio test as an alternative order-
ing principle, such as Feldman-Cousins [2] (which will be
discussed separately in the next section).
For comparison, the standard frequentist construction
for an upper bound on an average signal strength, S, in
a Poisson counting experiment where the expected back-
ground level is B and a total of n events is observed can
be written as follows:
n∑
m=0
(Sup +B)
me−(Sup+B)/m! = 1− CL (4)
where Sup can thus be interpreted as denoting the upper
limit on the range of model parameter values for which n
events or less would be observed with a relative frequency
of not more than 1−CL if the measurements were to be
repeated a large number of times. Note that this differs
from the Bayesian formula for a uniform prior only in
the absence of the background normalization. In other
words, for this construction, the possible number of back-
ground events is not constrained to be less than or equal
to the total number of all events observed in this partic-
ular measurement. This is because the probability being
calculated is that for observing n events during a generic
trial for an ensemble of measurements, and does not take
into account additional information available from any
particular observation (such as the fact that the number
3of background events actually detected cannot exceed n).
Thus, the probability associated with any particular mea-
surement is not a meaningful concept in the frequentist
approach.
This can also be seen by the fact that the lack of a
background normalization means that there will be cases
for which Equation 4 does not yield a positive solution
for Sup. These are instances where the observed number
of events is already deemed to be less probable than the
desired confidence level. Such “empty intervals” are per-
fectly allowed and, indeed, are necessary in order to guar-
antee the correct statistical coverage for the frequency of
observations within the overall ensemble of hypothetical
experiments. Individual frequentist bounds, however, do
not have meaning for model parameter values by them-
selves. Indeed, for a case where the confidence interval is
empty, the observer knows that for this particular data
set the confidence interval does not contain the true value
of the parameter, even if the repeated construction of
such confidence intervals would correctly bound it in, say,
90% of the cases where statistical fluctuations resulted in
different data sets. This distinction is fundamental: fre-
quentist confidence intervals are always statements about
how often a large ensemble of hypothetical experiments
will bound the true value, and are never a statement
that there is a particular probability that the true value
is contained in the interval for any individual data set.
In fact, in many cases for both standard frequentist and
Feldman-Cousins intervals, the experimenters may know
that it is very unlikely that the true model is contained in
the generated interval for their particular data set. This
situation often tends to conflict with the desired interpre-
tations of these bounds, since the question of interest to
most experimenters is the relevance of their own particu-
lar data set for the model parameter values under study,
rather than the behavior of a large ensemble of hypothet-
ical experiments that were not actually performed.
Feldman-Cousins
The approach of Feldman and Cousins [2] uses an or-
dering principle for the Neyman construction based on
the ratio of likelihoods which, for the measurement of a
quantity typified by a mean expectation, µ, is given by:
Λµ(x) =
L(x|µ)
L(x|µbest) (5)
where x is the measurement and µbest is the mean for
the hypothesis in the physical region for which the data
is most likely (not necessarily the most likely hypoth-
esis, an assessment of which would call for a Bayesian
construction).
In the standard frequentist case, the composition of in-
tervals is simply based on the expected relative frequency
of observations under each hypothesis. However, under
the Feldman-Cousins approach, the composition of in-
tervals is instead determined by a likelihood comparison
across potentially different hypotheses, which can there-
fore lead to less intuitive interval choices.
As an example of how these interval definitions can
differ, consider the case of a Gaussian variable with unit
variance and a mean of µ =0.5. Assume that this value
of µ is unknown to us, but represents a physical quan-
tity (such as a mass) that must be non-negative. From a
given observation, we then wish to define 90% CL bounds
for µ. Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of observa-
tions, P (x). The red striped area indicates the range of
observations for which the correct value of µ is bounded
by a central standard frequentist interval. These bounds
are symmetric, extending ±1.65σ relative to the value of
x = 0.5, as might be expected. However, as indicated
by the black striped area, the range of observations for
which the correct value of µ is bounded by a Feldman-
Cousins frequentist interval is notably asymmetric (due
to the fact that µbest ≥ 0). The actual mean is included
in the 90% CL interval for an observation of x = −1.6,
even though the observation is more than 2σ away from
the true value. On the other hand, the interval excludes
the true mean for an observation of x = 1.9, even though
this is less than 1.5σ away from the true mean and, hence,
nearly 3 times more likely to occur.
FIG. 1: Upper plot: Relative frequency for observations, x,
of a Gaussian variable with σ = 1 and µ = 0.5. The range
of observations for which the true mean is bounded for stan-
dard frequentist (red stripes) and Feldman-Cousins intervals
(black stripes) at 90% CL are shown. Lower plot: Values
of the corresponding ordering parameter used to define the
composition of the Feldman-Cousins interval.
4This counterintuitive result illustrates that the in-
terpretation of the Feldman-Cousins ordering principle,
which is not based directly on the frequency of the obser-
vation but instead on the likelihood ratio Λ(x|µ), is not
straightforward.
Feldman and Cousins cite Section 23.1 of the 5th edi-
tion of Kendall’s book [3] as implying the ordering prin-
ciple for their interval construction, but, in fact, Sections
31.31-31.34 of that same reference are much more ex-
plicit regarding the general use of a likelihood ratio to
define confidence intervals. These sections end with the
statement, “The difficulties with such an approach are, as
before, the lack of a frequency interpretation for P ∗ or,
indeed, any direct interpretation for the function. Here,
as elsewhere, the statistician must decide whether he or
she is willing to make the logical leap in order to justify
inferential statements that relate to single experiments.”
One stated purpose of the Feldman-Cousins construc-
tion is to avoid empty intervals, thus making the bounds
appear more physical for the model. However, as pre-
viously indicated, such empty intervals do not actually
pose any problems in principle since frequentist bounds
do not refer to direct restrictions on the physical model
and only take on meaning for a large ensemble of mea-
surements, where statistical coverage is indeed upheld.
While the ordering principle used in the Feldman-Cousins
approach ensures that intervals are never empty, which
many may find less disconcerting, this does not avoid the
basic issue that the bound for any particular data set
may not be meaningful, and situations in which conven-
tional frequentist intervals are empty are often situations
in which the Feldman-Cousins procedure returns a value
that is prone to misinterpretation as being an unduly
strict bound on a model.
Feldman and Cousins themselves recognized this prob-
lem, noting that this results from a confusion with
Bayesian inferences, which are more relevant for decision
making. Accordingly, they recommended accompanying
each limit by the average expected limit (the “sensitiv-
ity” of the measurement) “in order to provide informa-
tion that will assist in this (Bayesian) assessment.” Cases
in which the obtained limit is significantly better than
the expected sensitivity are cases where there is a higher
probability that the true parameter value is not contained
within the derived bounds. However, the expected limit
clearly does not represent an actual measurement, and
how information from this and/or the derived bounds
is to be quantitatively applied in order to arrive at a
Bayesian (or any other) assessment for these cases is not
at all clear. Furthermore, this issue does not, in fact, have
a clear threshold, as all negative fluctuations yield tighter
bounds than the expected limit. Even worse, merely pro-
ducing non-empty intervals by itself is not obviously an
improvement in relevance or clarity, since any particular
interval (empty or not) constructed for a given data set
will not generally contain the true parameter value with
a probability indicated by the quoted confidence interval,
in spite of a nearly universal tendency to misinterpret it
as such. The mere fact that Feldman-Cousins returns
non-empty intervals in some cases may actually obfus-
cate their nature. In many ways a null interval, while
disconcerting, at least is transparently not a limit on the
parameter, whereas a narrow but non-empty Feldman-
Cousins interval, such as often occurs when the data fluc-
tuates below the expected background, may give the false
impression that the confidence interval is meaningful for
bounding a model.
EXAMPLES OF THE BEHAVIOR OF UPPER
BOUNDS FOR LOW NUMBERS OF EVENTS
We will now explore a number of scenarios in the re-
gion of low event numbers that highlight the differences
between various interval constructions.
As an initial example, consider the scenario where the
expected number of background events, B, for 1 year
of running with a 1 kg detector is 9, but a statistical
fluctuation results in a total of only 5 events observed. A
fluctuation this low or lower would happen nearly 12% of
the time if the true signal rate were zero. We now wish to
construct a 90% CL (frequentist) or CI (Bayesian) upper
bound, Sup, on a signal of strength S.
Standard Frequentist
For the Standard Frequentist case, the above scenario
yields from Equation 4 a value of Sup = 0.27 events per
kg per year.
Now consider the further scenario in which we were
contemplating running the experiment for an additional
year. The second year of data would very likely yield a
number of background events much closer to the expected
mean, so we would likely end up with a total of approx-
imately 5+9=14 events where 18 are expected over the
2 year run. The same formalism would then result in a
value of Sup = 2.12 events per 2 kg-years, or a bound on
the rate of 1.06 events per kg per year, which is nearly 4
times less restrictive than the limit from the first year of
data.
Furthermore, consider the case for a new experiment
to be constructed with 100 times the fiducial mass. What
constraints is it likely to achieve? Here we can use
σ ∼ √N and the 1-sided Gaussian approximation that
90% CL corresponds to ∼1.28σ. This means that after
1 year of running we would typically expect a bound of
1.28
√
900/100kg = 0.38 events per kg per year, which is
still not as restrictive as the first run with a substantially
inferior experiment.
5Therefore, using the value of the derived frequentist
bounds alone to assess the relevance of a given experi-
mental observation leads to a counter-intuitive behavior
that does not appear to place the measurement in the de-
sired context. This demonstrates that individual frequen-
tist bounds do not actually relate to restrictions on the
model and do not even necessarily represent a measure of
how sensitive or informative one experimental measure-
ment is relative to another one. Frequentist bounds only
take on meaning in these regards in the actual presence
of a large ensemble measurements, but not individually.
Compare this with the Bayesian case below.
Bayesian
Here we will assume that all non-negative rates have
an a priori equal probability density and, accordingly,
choose a uniform prior in S for S ≥ 0. While numerical
values for the derived bounds may be modified under a
different assumption, their qualitative behavior will re-
main the same. For the case at hand (9 events expected,
5 observed), the uniform prior assumption yields a value
of Sup = 3.88 events per kg per year, which is ∼14 times
larger than the standard frequentist bound.
Now consider again what would happen if we decided
to run the experiment for another year, once more as-
suming that we would likely end up with 14 events with
18 expected over two years. The above formalism would
then result in a bound of 5.89 for the 2-year run, or a 90%
CI rate limit of 2.945 per kg per year, which is noticeably
better than before.
For the case of a 1-year exposure of an experiment with
100 times the fiducial mass, the limit would approach
0.38 events per kg per year (as before), which is very
significantly better.
Thus, Bayesian bounds on the actual model behave as
would be expected for something that reflects the success
and relevance of a given experimental measurement, in-
dicating that it is generally beneficial to run for longer
and build better experiments under such scenarios.
A Bayesian calculation will also result in a more strin-
gent upper bound for downward fluctuations because
these bounds make explicit use of the constraint that the
number of background events actually detected cannot be
larger than the total number of observed events (i.e. the
denominator of Equation 3). The most stringent bounds
therefore always occur when n = 0, since the number
of backgrounds is then also known to be identically zero
for this observation. Hence, Bayesian intervals are inde-
pendent of the expected background rate for such cases.
However, this is not so for the frequentist case, which
has no such normalization and where much larger vari-
ations for individual measurements are allowed because
less likely measurements carry inherently less weight in
the ensemble of other possible outcomes that defines the
coverage. A frequentist limit based on an observed non-
zero n can, counterintuitively, even be more stringent
than a limit for n = 0, depending on the expected back-
ground levels for each case.
Feldman-Cousins
The Feldman-Cousins (F-C) bound on the scenario of 9
expected background events and 5 observed events yields
a 90% CL value of Sup = 2.38. This is ∼9 times larger
than the standard frequentist bound but a factor of ∼1.6
smaller than the Bayesian uniform prior value, so clearly
has a different interpretation than either of these other
approaches. It neither refers to bounds on the physical
model, as in Bayesian limits, nor are the sets of observ-
ables selected to define the statistical coverage necessarily
in direct proportion to the frequency of possible measure-
ments, as in standard frequentist intervals.
This can be seen even more clearly by considering a
more extreme example in which 5 background events are
expected but no events are observed during the run. In
the Bayesian approach, the background is known to be
identically zero for this one and only measurement, lead-
ing to a 90% CI upper bound on an average signal of
2.3 (uniform prior case). For the standard frequentist
approach, concerned with the frequency of the observed
number of counts in a large ensemble of experiments, an
empty interval is returned for a 90% CL since this ob-
servation has a probability of much less than 10% even
under the zero signal hypothesis, so no positive signal
strength can accommodate the criteria. However, for F-
C, the following Table I shows the upper limits obtained
for different confidence intervals.
Confidence Level 68.27% 90% 95% 99%
Upper Bound on S 0.19 0.98 1.54 2.94
TABLE I: Feldman-Cousins upper bounds on S when 5 counts
are expected but none are observed (an occurrence with a
statistical frequency of less than 1% for S=0).
It may look odd to have intervals for S with up to
nearly 3 signal events allowed for these confidence levels
when, for an expected background of 5 events, the fre-
quency with which no counts would be observed even if
S were identically zero is only 0.67%. However, this is a
reflection of how the acceptance region in the observable
has been distributed in a way that is not proportional to
the frequency of possible observations and that the sta-
tistical coverage only takes on meaning for the ensemble.
As mentioned previously, Feldman and Cousins did
recognize the problematic nature of limits such as those
in Table I and recommended stating both the limit and
6the expected sensitivity, which in this case is 5.18 at 90%
C.L. for S = 0, more than 5 times larger than what ap-
pears in the table. This large difference between the ex-
pected sensitivity and the limit is a warning flag that the
limit should be interpreted with extreme caution. Had
one event been observed, the Feldman-Cousins 90% limit
would be 1.22, and for nobs = 2 it would be 1.73, all of
which are noticeably lower than the expected sensitiv-
ity. However, the probability of nobs ≤ 2 is by no means
negligible (12.5%). The fact that the Feldman-Cousins
procedure results in limits that appear restrictive but are
actually less likely to contain the true value of the param-
eter in such a significant fraction of cases is ultimately
unsatisfactory.
Various attempts have been made to modify the
Feldman-Cousins procedure to improve its performance
for downwards fluctuations in background. Roe and
Woodroofe presented an approach in which the likelihood
is replaced by a “conditioned” likelihood, where the con-
fidence intervals are constructed using conditional prob-
abilities given the constraint that the number of back-
ground events cannot exceed the total number of ob-
served events [4]. While this generates satisfactory re-
sults in the specific case of Poisson processes, Cousins
has shown that this procedure does not generalize well,
and gives unsatisfactory results for a continuous Gaus-
sian variable near a physical boundary [5]. In response,
Roe and Woodroofe have proposed using Bayesian cred-
ible intervals in a similar way to what we will discuss
in this paper, and have explored some of their coverage
properties [6].
Example of Behavior Under an Improved Analysis
As one more example to compare the behavior of up-
per limits for the different approaches, first consider the
case where 5 backgrounds are expected and 2 events are
observed. The resulting 90% CL/CI upper bounds are
given in the first column of Table 2. Now assume that
an improved analysis technique is developed that is ex-
pected to reduce the background levels by a factor of
10 while not impacting the efficiency of signal detection.
When this is applied to the same data set, the events
previously observed are cut. The new 90% CL/CI upper
bounds are then re-computed and given in the second
column of Table II.
For both standard and F-C frequentist approaches,
paradoxically, the improved analysis actually results in a
worse constraint on S. Only the Bayesian limit improves,
behaving more as would be intuitively expected under
this scenario. This example goes to further illustrate the
point already made: that individual frequentist bounds
neither relate to restrictions on the model, nor do they
necessarily represent a measure of how sensitive or in-
formative one experimental measurement is relative to
another one.
Improved Cuts:
B=5, n=2 B=0.5, n=0
Standard Frequentist 0.32 1.8
Feldman-Cousins 1.73 1.94
Bayesian 3.13 2.3
TABLE II: 90% CL/CI upper bounds on S when 5 background
counts are expected and 2 events are observed, compared with
those for an analysis with 10 times better background rejec-
tion.
Pragmatically, we believe that any useful method for
producing limits must do so for any data observation,
with a meaning that is easy to interpret and provides a
reasonable, robust and intuitive basis on which to com-
pare results. Both the standard and Feldman-Cousins
methods appear to fail in this regard a non-negligible
fraction of the time, and the suggestion that this problem
can be dealt with by simply quoting the expected sensi-
tivity and leaving the interpretation to the individual’s
judgement does not seem like a viable way to proceed.
EXAMPLE OF ISSUES WITH INTERVALS IN
THE PRESENCE OF A CLEAR SIGNAL
Up to now, examples have focused on potential issues
of misinterpretation related to upper bounds. We give
here an example where a 2-sided interval construction
for a clear signal can also lead to complications for a
frequentist approach.
Consider the case of an ultra-high energy neutrino de-
tector, such as IceCube [7], looking for signs of extra-
terrestrial neutrinos from astrophysical sources. Assume
that the instrument has a known Gaussian energy resolu-
tion and that one event with an apparent energy well be-
yond expectations for atmospheric neutrinos is observed.
Say we now wish to construct a confidence interval for
the energy of the neutrino itself (as opposed to the de-
posited energy). However, the likely energy of the event
is strongly dependent on the index of the underlying en-
ergy spectrum, which is unknown. For example, the ob-
servation is much more likely to have resulted from the
fluctuation of a lower energy event if the underlying dif-
ferential neutrino spectrum was proportional to E−3 as
opposed to E−2 or E−1. Without knowing this index, it
is therefore not possible to uniquely define a hypotheti-
cal ensemble of repeated measurements, and frequentist
bounds on the deposited energy alone can be misleading
if incorrectly interpreted in terms of the neutrino energy.
One could treat the index as a nuisance parameter but, as
shown later, the associated uncertainties still cannot be
propagated in a self-consistent manner using a purely fre-
quentist framework. However, Bayesian bounds are well-
defined, where the dependence on the assumed spectral
7prior is made explicit and the sensitivity to this choice
can be shown.
While this example was chosen as a particularly clear
case, all intervals are subject to this issue at some level. If
the choice of prior is obvious or does not matter, Bayesian
bounds are unambiguous. If the choice of prior is not
clear and leads to differences in interpretation, a Bayesian
construction is explicit regarding this context, whereas
the misinterpretation of a frequentist interval as bounds
on a model can lead to erroneous conclusions that are
effectively based on an assumed but hidden prior.
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL LIMITS
It has already been noted that frequentist intervals do
not necessarily reflect the relevance of individual experi-
mental measurements. However, this issue is worth fur-
ther discussion since the comparison of derived frequen-
tist intervals from different experiments are often made
on exclusion plots etc., which can lead to erroneous con-
clusions.
To illustrate this, consider the scenario of two count-
ing experiments making observations to place bounds on
an possible signal. The first of these has an expected
background of just 1 count, while the second suffers from
a higher average background level. Now consider the
ensemble of comparisons between 90% CL/CI upper in-
terval bounds for Experiment #1 and Experiment #2
under the zero signal hypothesis. Figure 2 plots the frac-
tion of times the derived upper bound for the interval of
Experiment #2 is found to be smaller than that of Exper-
iment #1 as a function of the average background level
for Experiment #2. Some unevenness due to Poisson
quantization can be seen, especially for lower background
numbers. However, in all cases, this fraction is substan-
tially greater for Feldman-Cousins (crosses) as compared
with Bayesian (circles) intervals, with the difference as
large as a factor of ∼3 at higher background levels. In
other words, bounds derived from Feldman-Cousins are
less likely to reflect the relative sensitivities of experi-
ments.
Another indicator of the robustness of derived bounds
under the hypothesis of zero signal is the size of the RMS
deviation associated with the difference between two such
bounds, obtained for pairs of experiments with identical
expected background levels. This is shown in Figure 3
for the 90% CL/CI upper bound in intervals for uniform-
prior Bayesian (circles) and Feldman-Cousins (crosses)
constructions as a function of the average background
level for both experiments. In all cases, the Feldman-
Cousins bounds correspond to RMS values that are over
30% larger than for the Bayesian case, indicating that
these are noticeably less robust, being more likely to
yield apparent discrepancies between different experi-
ments and to change under repeated observations.
FIG. 2: The fraction of times that the derived 90% CL/CI up-
per interval bounds for Experiment #2 (higher background)
are found to be more restrictive than those of Experiment #1
(background of 1 event) as a function of the average back-
ground level for Experiment #2. Cases for uniform-prior
Bayesian (circles) and Feldman-Cousins (crosses) construc-
tions are shown. Some unevenness due to Poisson quantiza-
tion is visible.
FIG. 3: The RMS deviation between 90% CL/CI upper in-
terval bounds from two experiments with the same expected
background level. Cases for uniform-prior Bayesian (circles)
and Feldman-Cousins (crosses) constructions are shown for
the zero signal hypothesis as a function of expected back-
ground level. Notably larger fluctuations in the derived
bounds are seen for the Feldman-Cousins case.
8These issues are more than of esoteric interest, and sev-
eral examples can be found where the representation of
experimental results appear to run into difficulties when
couched in a frequentist context.
KARMEN II
The Karmen II neutrino oscillation experiment ob-
served zero events during its initial run between Febru-
ary 1997 and April 1998, where the expected background
was 2.88±0.13 [8]. Derived Feldman-Cousins bounds
consequently yielded an upper limit of 1.07 events at
the 90% CL, more than a factor of two more restric-
tive than uniform-prior Bayesian bounds would have pro-
duced. This led to numerous incorrect statements in
the literature concerning constraints on model param-
eters and the widespread promulgation of exclusion plots
comparing frequentist bounds that erroneously suggested
significantly better constraints relative to other experi-
ments than were justified. Further data gathered up to
March 2000 quadrupled the statistics and, after fluctua-
tions took their due course, 11 events were observed in
the full data set compared to 12.3±0.6 expected [9]. This
produced nearly identical constraints to the previous set,
which had only 1/4 the exposure. Had uniform-prior
Bayesian bounds been used instead, the experimenters
would have found that their constraints were initially less
restrictive, but then improved by a factor of ∼2 when the
statistics were quadrupled, in line with expectation.
LEP and LHC (The CLs+b Method)
Members of the ALEPH, DELPHI, L3 and OPAL col-
laborations recognized the potential difficulties in inter-
preting frequentist limits in the face of fluctuations. In
their joint 2003 paper ‘Search for the standard model
Higgs boson at LEP,’ [10], the authors note the follow-
ing regarding frequentist intervals: “...this procedure may
lead to the undesired possibility that a large downward
fluctuation of the background would allow hypotheses to
be excluded for which the experiment has no sensitivity
due to the small expected signal rate.” Their solution was
to re-define their “frequentist” upper bounds based on
the ratio of the chance probability for the observation un-
der a given signal+background hypothesis to that under
the hypothesis of background alone [11]. In the context
of a simple counting experiment, this “CLs+b method”
would therefore take the form of Equation 3 which, in
fact, is a Bayesian bound with uniform prior. The equiv-
alence with a Bayesian bound also holds for a Gaussian
with a prior uniform in the mean, and can sometimes
be found for other distributions with different choices of
prior. However, this equivalence is not true in general
and, in particular, does not hold for the likelihood ratio
test statistic often used to search for new particles.
While the CLs+b statistic avoids bounds that may ap-
pear overly strict for negative fluctuations, the interpre-
tation of the associated confidence levels is unclear and,
in fact, is variable, depending on the test statistic. It
does not guarantee frequentist coverage, nor does it nec-
essarily provide well-defined bounds on model parame-
ter values themselves (and even in cases where there is a
Bayesian equivalent, the form of the prior is not explicitly
evident). Nevertheless, the technique is now ubiquitous
amongst LHC experiments as well, being used (as with
LEP) essentially as a binary assessment as to whether
an observation is significant. If so, a 2-sided Feldman-
Cousins interval is then typically quoted, though this
scheme now violates the principles on which the Feldman-
Cousins method is predicated (i.e. that the nature of
the interval is automatically determined by the construc-
tion). For such a binary assessment, it is unclear what
advantage this provides over a simple p-value (test of
consistency with the zero signal hypothesis). Beyond
this, if one wished to constrain model parameter values
themselves with well-defined confidence levels, appropri-
ate Bayesian bounds could instead be derived.
It is worth emphasizing again that the issue of negative
fluctuations is entirely a consequence of misinterpreting
frequentist bounds or, equivalently, using the wrong con-
struction to answer a Bayesian question. We find it cu-
rious that, in order to apparently avoid a philosophical
issue about providing an unambiguous interpretation, the
authors have instead opted to use a scheme without any
consistent interpretation at all. A more straightforward
approach would be to confront the specific nature of the
questions being posed and then adopt an appropriate,
well-defined and consistent mathematical formalism.
ZEPLIN III
In 2009, the ZEPLIN III collaboration published their
first bounds on dark matter [12]. The limits were largely
based on a large region within the signal box where no
events were observed. The authors noted that the fit ex-
pectation for the average background level was greater
than this and, together with the difficulty in quantifying
some systematics associated with the background extrap-
olation, this “compromised” the use of frequentist tech-
niques, such as maximum likelihood or Feldman-Cousins.
Consequently, they instead used the maximum value al-
lowed for a Feldman-Cousins 90% CL interval of 2.44 (the
value at n = B = 0). Clearly, while this may be seen as a
“conservative estimate” of a frequentist bound that must
be greater than 90%, the meaning of the confidence level
beyond this is simply not defined. Had the authors in-
stead used a Bayesian approach with a uniform prior,
they would have arrived at a bound of 2.3 at 90% CI —
a value that is, in fact, well-defined for this case.
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The EXO collaboration published first results from the
EXO-200 neutrinoless double beta-decay experiment in
2012 [13]. In the ±1σ energy resolution window around
the endpoint, 1 event was observed where a background
of 4.1±0.3 counts was expected. Using a spectrum fit,
the authors derived a bound of <2.8 total signal counts
at the 90% CL, corresponding to a lower bound to the
half-life for 0νββ of 1.6×1025 years. A Feldman-Cousins
bound based on the ±1σ bin would have yielded a limit
of less than 2.0 signal counts at 90% CL (accounting for
the 68% signal efficiency of the bin), corresponding to an
even more restrictive 90% CL lower bound for the half-
life due to the negative fluctuation of 2.2×1025 years. On
the other hand, a Bayesian bound with a prior uniform in
counting rate based on the ±1σ bin would have yielded
a limit of less than 4.0 signal counts, corresponding to a
90% CI lower bound to the half-life of only 1.1×1025 years
— seemingly less restrictive than the Feldman-Cousins
bound by a factor of two.
The EXO data falls exactly into the category of para-
doxical situations for frequentist intervals previously de-
scribed, where improved background rejection and/or
longer periods of data collection would likely result in
less restrictive bounds than for the initial case. And, in
fact, an update of EXO-200 results published in 2014 us-
ing two years of data with quadruple the exposure of
the initial result appeared to actually suggest a posi-
tive ∼ 1.2σ fluctuation in the larger data set that ac-
centuates this effect [14]. Within the ±1σ energy reso-
lution window around the endpoint, 21 events were ob-
served where a background of 16±2 counts was expected
[15]. All approaches derive similar bounds for this case:
the authors derived a 1-sided 90% CL lower bound to
the 0νββ half-life of t1/2 > 1.1 × 1025 years by apply-
ing Wilks’ Theorem to a likelihood analysis, which is a
factor of 1.45 less restrictive than the initial result. A
Feldman-Cousins analysis based on the ±1σ bin would
yield a bound of t1/2 > 1.3 × 1025 years, a factor of 1.7
less restrictive than the F-C bound from the initial re-
sult. However, a Bayesian bound, with a prior uniform
in counting rate and based on the same bin yields a value
of t1/2 > 1.4× 1025 years or, using the appropriate inte-
gration of the posterior probability derived from the pro-
vided likelihood curve assuming a uniform prior, a value
of t1/2 > 1.2 × 1025 years. Both Bayesian calculations
are modestly more restrictive than the initial Bayesian
result, thus better reflecting the relevance of the measure-
ments and providing a substantially more stable basis for
comparison in the face of these background fluctuations.
These results are summarised in Table III.
These are just a few obvious examples of cases sam-
pled across a number of different areas in particle physics.
Spectrum F-C Bayesian
+ Wilks’ (±1σ bin) (±1σ bin)
Data Set 1 >1.6 >2.2 >1.1
Data Set 2 >1.1 >1.3 >1.4
(integration: >1.2)
Set 1 / Set 2 1.45 1.7 0.78 (0.92)
TABLE III: Derived 90% CL/CI lower bounds on the half-
lives for 0νββ in units of 1025 years from EXO data using
various approaches. ‘Data Set 1’ is from the initial 2012 pub-
lication [13] and ‘Data Set 2’ is from the 2014 publication with
quadruple the exposure [14]. The ratios of bounds between
data sets are also given. Notably less restrictive frequentist
bounds result from the larger data set owing to background
fluctuations, whereas the Bayesian bound modestly improves.
However, the fact is that all such comparisons of exper-
imental results using frequentist bounds are sensitive to
these issues at some level.
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE TREATMENT
OF NUISANCE PARAMETERS
The concept of frequentist coverage presents particular
challenges when trying to incorporate the effects of other
unknown parameters. A confidence interval construction
is said to have, say, 90% coverage if, for any true value
of a parameter θ that is to be estimated, an ensemble of
repeated experiments would result in constructions that
would contain this value in 90% of the repetitions.
Consider now the case that the likelihood L(x|θ, ξ) de-
pends on a second parameter ξ. Here ξ may either be
a parameter of physics interest, or a nuisance parame-
ter representing the effects of a systematic uncertainty.
A common experimental problem is to determine a 1D
confidence interval for θ, independent of the value of ξ.
Standard frequentist techniques can readily define a 2D
confidence region in the θ, ξ plane so that, for any point
(θ, ξ), the generated region will contain that point in 90%
of random trials. But these techniques do not provide any
satisfactory way of producing a 1D confidence interval for
θ, independent of ξ, with a desired level of coverage.
Two possible definitions of coverage may be considered
in this case. The “strong” definition of coverage would be
that the 1D interval generated by the method should con-
tain the true value of θ in 90% of cases, for any values of
θ and ξ. This would be the desired definition of coverage
for a purely frequentist construction, since ξ may repre-
sent a parameter whose value is constant but unknown,
and not subject to fluctuations from trial to trial.
One may also consider a “weak” coverage requirement.
In this approach, ξ is thought of as a random variable
that may have a different value every time the exper-
iment is done (although this is not always the case in
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actuality). If the frequency distribution for ξ is known
and denoted by f(ξ), then we could less stringently re-
quire that the frequency for the 1D interval generated by
a random measurement x to contain the true value of θ
is 90%, averaging over ξ. For some fixed true value of ξ,
the 1D confidence interval generated might not have the
desired 90% coverage, but since the true value of ξ is, by
assumption, not known, we are content if:∫
dξf(ξ)αθ(ξ) = 0.9 (6)
where αθ(ξ) is the coverage at true value θ for a particular
true value of ξ:
αθ(ξ) =
∫
x∈R
dxP (x|θ, ξ). (7)
Here R denotes the region in the measurement space
X determined by whatever ordering principle is used to
construct the confidence intervals.
If αθ(ξ) is a constant, not depending on ξ, then the
coverage is in fact independent of the nuisance parameter
and the strong definition of coverage is obtained.
Note that there is no essential difference between the
case where ξ is a true nuisance parameter versus the case
that we wish to incorporate the effect of one “physics”
parameter in the projected confidence region for another,
such as generating a 1D confidence interval for the neu-
trino mixing parameter θ23 from a likelihood function
that depends on θ23 and ∆m
2
32.
The Frequentist Minimization Procedure
The commonly recommended frequentist prescription
for eliminating a nuisance parameter is the “profile”
method, in which the profiled likelihood is generated by
maximizing L(x|θ, ξ) over ξ for each fixed value of θ:
L(x|θ) = max
ξ
L(x|θ, ξ) (8)
This suggests that, for example, to generate a
Feldman-Cousins confidence interval in the presence of
a nuisance parameter, we should form the following like-
lihood ratio:
Λθ(x) =
L(x|θ, ξˆθ(x))
L(x|θˆ, ξˆ) (9)
Here in the numerator, ξˆθ(x) is the value of ξ that maxi-
mizes the likelihood for a fixed value of θ. In the denom-
inator, θˆ and ξˆ are the values of these parameters that
globally maximize the likelihood. In all cases Λ ≤ 1.
For any value of θ, there is a critical value cθ for which θ
will be included in the confidence interval if Λθ(x) > cθ.
The value of cθ is chosen by construction so that the
frequency with which this selection occurs is 90%.
Ideally, we would want the critical value cθ to be inde-
pendent of ξ. In that case, the strong coverage condition
holds, and the integrity of the profiled 1D frequentist in-
terval is maintained.
A Simple Example
Suppose we perform a single measurement of a quan-
tity expected to follow a Gaussian distribution with mean
θ + ξ and an RMS of 1, and that the result of this mea-
surement is x. In this case, θ and ξ are degenerate. Let
us therefore suppose that we have further knowledge that
ξ = A± 1, with ξ following a Gaussian distribution with
mean A and RMS 1. This could result from a previous
measurement of ξ, such as from a calibration run. The
(unnormalized) joint likelihood function is therefore:
L(x|θ, ξ) = exp[−1
2
(x− (θ+ ξ))2] exp[−1
2
(ξ−A)2] (10)
It is trivial to see that this is globally maximized for
ξˆ = A, θˆ = x−A, at which point L(x|θˆ, ξˆ) = 1.
For any fixed value of θ, the likelihood is maximized at
ξˆθ(x) =
x− θ +A
2
(11)
This is just the arithmetic average of the value ξ = x− θ
that maximizes the first factor in the likelihood, and the
best fit value ξ = A from the second factor. If the two
Gaussian terms in the likelihood had different σ’s, this
would instead be a weighted average.
Inserting this expression into Eq. 9 gives
Λθ(x) = exp[−1
4
(x−A− θ)2]. (12)
This is the ordering parameter. For any fixed (θ, ξ),
we can predict the distribution of x and, hence, of Λθ(x),
and determine the critical value cθ for Λθ(x) such that:∫
dxL(x|θ, ξ)H(Λθ(x)− cθ)∫
dxL(x|θ, ξ) = 0.9 (13)
where H is the Heaviside step function to insure that we
include θ in the confidence interval only if Λθ(x) > cθ.
Since the distribution of x depends on ξ but Λθ(x) does
not, it is clear that Equation 13 cannot be guaranteed to
hold for all ξ. Therefore, the confidence interval construc-
tion does not satisfy the strong coverage condition—the
procedure does not yield confidence intervals that give
the correct coverage for all combinations of θ and ξ.
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In this case, one might at least try to err on the side
of caution by choosing the smallest critical value that is
obtained for any ξ, giving the desired coverage level for
that one value of ξ and giving over-coverage for other
values. (For example, Cranmer has proposed including
in the 1D interval any value of θ for which the standard
2D confidence region is not empty for at least one value
of ξ [17].) However, this method not only is extremely
likely to give over-coverage for almost all true values of ξ,
but also may give overly large intervals dictated by the
most extreme possible value of ξ.
The alternative is to give up on the strong coverage
condition and settle for “weak coverage”, as per Equa-
tion 6. To achieve this, one can simply interpret the
likelihood function as a joint probability distribution for
x and ξ. Drawing values for x and ξ randomly from
this distribution (for fixed θ), one can, for example, then
calculate the distribution for Λθ(x) by Monte Carlo and
determine the appropriate critical value to give the de-
sired coverage. Correct coverage of the “weak” kind is
then obtained with the following meaning: if the exper-
iment were done a large number of times, and if ξ had
a different random value for each trial with a joint prob-
ability distribution L(ξ, x|θ), then 90% of the generated
intervals would contain the true value of θ.
This is clearly a hybrid approach. In order to create
a “frequentist” interval with desired coverage for θ, we
are integrating out the nuisance parameter ξ. In doing
this, we are forced to treat ξ in a Bayesian way, with
an assumed prior distribution, and must partly abandon
the frequentist paradigm. This is of course exactly the
approach of Cousins-Highland [18], and its performance
and that of profiling the likelihood have been explored
by a number of authors [19, 20]. The contribution of
this Bayesian aspect to the overall confidence interval is
not necessarily small since, for example, it is a common
goal to run experiments to the point where systematic
uncertainties dominate.
Even if one still chose to accept a pseudo-Bayesian way
of getting rid of nuisance parameters in order to create
pseudo-frequentist intervals on the remaining parameters
of interest, the incursion of Bayesian philosophy cannot
necessarily be so simply contained. Consider the case of
a neutrino oscillation experiment with no systematic un-
certainties, and sensitivity to two oscillation parameters
∆m2, θ. While one can readily produce frequentist con-
fidence regions in the 2D contour plane, what happens
if we want to quote a 1D limit on either of the param-
eters? This is mathematically identical to eliminating a
nuisance parameter, although, in this case, the parame-
ter is actually one of physical interest. Except in special
cases, it is not possible to produce 1D frequentist confi-
dence intervals with correct coverage for all values of the
other parameter. The best that can be hoped for is to
achieve “weak” coverage, but this then implies marginal-
ising in a Bayesian way over the other parameter (as, for
example, in [21]). One is forced to be Bayesian about
any parameter that is being eliminated from the prob-
lem, or else abandon the notion of defining a consistent
statistical coverage.
We suggest that, rather than seeking such work-
arounds and compromises to the frequentist treatment
of nuisance parameters, it is prudent to instead ask why
such steps are necessary in the first place. If the mathe-
matical framework is inconsistent, this may suggest that
the thinking leading up to the use of such an approach is
also inconsistent and, therefore, likely to lead to further
difficulties and misinterpretations.
Bayesian Treatment of Nuisance Parameters
Nuisance parameters present no special difficulties for
a Bayesian analysis. If L(D|θ, ξ) is a likelihood func-
tion for a datum D depending on a nuisance parameter
ξ, any constraints on this parameter are easily included
as part of the prior in Bayes’ Theorem. For example, ξ
might represent the rate of a background process, per-
haps measured in a separate calibration or side channel.
A probability distribution g(ξ) can then be assigned for ξ
which, together with a prior f(θ) for the physics param-
eter θ, can be used as priors in Bayes Theorem to give a
joint posterior distribution for both θ and ξ:
P (θ, ξ|D) ∝ L(D|θ, ξ)f(θ)g(ξ) (14)
Dependence on the unwanted parameter ξ can then be
removed simply by integrating the posterior distribution
with respect to ξ.
It is worth noting that because the likelihood function
L(D|θ, ξ) depends on ξ, the measurement itself may often
contain useful information on the true value of ξ. Incor-
porating prior information on ξ along with information
derived from D through the likelihood makes full use of
all of the information about ξ that is available. This is
often a superior approach to Monte Carlo methods in
which random values of ξ are drawn from the distribu-
tion g(ξ), and then used to fit for θ, with ξ held constant
in each fit. If the Monte Carlo approach is used, the re-
sults of fitting for θ using each random throw of ξ should
ideally be weighted by the calculated likelihood for that
value of ξ.
Choosing appropriate priors for nuisance parameters
representing systematic uncertainties is also generally
straightforward in practice. If the constraint on the nui-
sance parameter is the result of an independent measure-
ment, the likelihood function for that measurement can
be an appropriate choice of prior for g(ξ) in Equation 14
(possibly further modified by any theoretical priors on
ξ itself). Physical boundaries, such as requiring back-
ground rates to be non-negative, are easily incorporated
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by setting the prior to zero in the unphysical region and,
in fact, should always be included to prevent unphysical
behavior in the posterior distribution. In the case that
there is no previous measurement upon which to base a
prior for the nuisance parameter, the guidelines in Sec-
tion (“Choice of Bayesian Priors”) may be used.
contains further discussion of the mathematical rela-
tionship between integrating over a nuisance parameter
vs. maximizing the likelihood with respect to one.
ISSUES WITH UNIFICATION
The paper of Feldman and Cousins advocates the use
of a “unified approach,” in which the formalism of the in-
terval construction itself dictates whether upper bounds
or two-sided confidence intervals are given. The argu-
ment for this is to avoid the problem of “flip-flopping,”
whereby different experimenters choose for themselves
when to quote a given type of interval based on the result,
leading to a small statistical bias in frequentist coverage
in some cases if one were to do an unfiltered survey of
only those frequentist intervals reported. It should be
emphasized again that this is a purely frequentist issue
— Bayesian intervals are immune to such effects as they
are not defined with respect to ensembles.
The frequency with which signals are excluded can, for
borderline cases, be as much as 50% higher than would be
inferred from the nominal confidence level (see Appendix
B). In other words, an ensemble of 90% CL bounds may
only have 85% coverage. This deviation from nominal
coverage is of similar magnitude to the inherent varia-
tions in frequentist coverage due to quantized Poisson
statistics (see Appendix A). In practice, it is also the
case that any such biases are often dwarfed by other fac-
tors, including difficulties in assessing and propagating
systematic uncertainties, accounting for look-elsewhere
effects, and various details of the particular analysis ap-
proach employed. In addition, it should be considered
that results are generally not taken purely at face value,
but are often re-analyzed and combined with other re-
sults when appropriate and that the effect in question di-
minishes as significance levels move away from the cross-
over region (where measurements are generally viewed
conservatively in any case, independent of what type of
interval may be quoted). Therefore, the potential impact
of “flip-flopping” is, in fact, not particularly significant
in relative terms.
On the other hand, the adoption of a unified approach
imposes substantial constraints that can lead to non-
trivial difficulties:
• The approach conflicts with the desired and scien-
tifically well-motivated convention to quote a 90%
or 95% CL for upper/lower bounds for results that
are consistent with the zero signal hypothesis, but
to only claim a 2-sided discovery interval when the
zero signal hypothesis is rejected at a considerably
higher confidence level (typically in excess of 3 or
more standard deviations). Indeed, even in cases
where a unified 2-sided interval may be shown, it
is often accompanied by the phrase, “we regard
this as an upper limit” when the significance is not
judged to have passed a critical level, despite the
fact that the coverage is not appropriate for such a
limit.
• A unified approach cannot easily cope with look-
elsewhere effects (i.e. trials factors). For example,
if a search for gamma-ray emission from 1000 differ-
ent astrophysical sources results in no event excess
exceeding 3 standard deviations above the back-
ground levels, the data may be judged to be con-
sistent with statistical fluctuations and the most
appropriate things to quote are upper bounds on
the possible emission from each source. However,
a unified approach would instead necessitate a 3σ
detection interval for observations consistent with
chance fluctuations.
• Even in the case of a clear detection, it may still
be relevant to also quote upper and lower bounds
in the context of certain models. For example,
some classes of models may simply place bounds on
the allowed maximum luminosity of a given source.
Thus, different interval constructions can be simul-
taneously valid and relevant for the same results,
as they simply address different questions.
These difficulties appear to substantially outweigh any
benefit of making what is, in the end, a minor correc-
tion to frequentist coverage. Therefore, on balance, we
believe it is pragmatically advantageous to allow the na-
ture of interval constructions to be determined by the
experimenters themselves based on an assessment of sci-
entific relevance, rather than having these dictated by an
inflexible and, ultimately, inappropriate formalism.
CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND
CONFUSION
The likelihood function is central to all the approaches
described and increasingly constrains the model parame-
ters and dominates the definition of these intervals with
increasing numbers of events. Hence, in the limit of
large numbers of events, the dependence on the particu-
lar choice of prior becomes insignificant in the Bayesian
construction, and the Feldman-Cousins ordering param-
eter has little effect away from a physical boundary such
as the origin. All methods therefore converge on the
same bounds in this region. This helps to address the
question of what constitutes a sufficient ensemble of mea-
surements in the frequentist approach for the constructed
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intervals to begin to reliably constrain a model. Namely,
this occurs when there is a sufficient sampling to well-
characterize the likelihood space of measurements, at
which point such an approach would produce the same
answer as for the Bayesian method.
The deviation between approaches in the region of low
numbers of events is therefore largely a reflection of the
fact that there is not yet enough information to make a
more definitive statement about the model without sup-
plying at least some additional constraints. The frequen-
tist approach in this case is to simply place the mea-
surement in context for some hopeful ensemble of other
experiments without trying to identify the model, while
the Bayesian approach is typically to seek out some min-
imal set of “reasonable and conservative” constraints in
order to infer which model parameter values are the most
likely. These philosophies are not mutually exclusive —
both goals are valuable in the case of limited information
and simply need to be appropriately defined and distin-
guished.
However, in many cases, a lack of clarity in this regard
and a reticence to provide both types of information has
led to confusion. An informal survey of physics journal
articles suggests that, in a large fraction of cases, quoted
frequentist intervals are often used to make statements
regarding constraints on model parameter values, either
by the authors themselves or by others in subsequent
articles, even when the natures of the intervals are ex-
plicitly stated. Parameter exclusion plots, as the name
implies, are instinctively interpreted as defining allowed
and disallowed regions of model parameter space based
on the data. This is an inherently Bayesian interpreta-
tion, yet the nature of the derived contours is not al-
ways consistent with this. We believe there is need of a
more pragmatic approach which recognizes that, while it
is critical to objectively convey the information content
of the data, there is also a strong desire to derive bounds
on model parameter values and a natural instinct to in-
terpret things this way.
TOWARDS A MORE RELEVANT AND
TRANSPARENT APPROACH
Relevant Statements for Scientific Papers
We start with an attempt to distill the basic statements
that are desirable to make regarding the nature of results
from an experimental measurement. There are typically
four issues of relevance:
1. To present the measured value of a direct observ-
able and an assessment of systematic uncertainties
that could bias the measurement. This results in a
simple, objective statement concerning the obser-
vation.
2. To address the question,“How often would a mea-
surement ‘like mine’ occur under the zero signal
hypothesis?” This is a frequency question probing
statistical consistency and focusing on an observ-
able in the context of a single, fixed model (i.e. a
Fisher-type test). For this, the normalized PDF for
observations under the zero signal hypothesis can
be appropriately integrated (including integration
over any nuisance parameters) to arrive at an as-
sessment, i.e. a “p-value”. There is, however, some
ambiguity in what is meant by ‘like mine.’ For
example, “How likely is it to measure a rate this
high?” or “How likely is it to measure a rate this
far away from the predicted value under the zero
signal hypothesis?” As there is not a general form
for this, it needs to be defined in a relevant way on a
case-by-case basis. Note that this is not equivalent
to defining a frequentist interval — the result is just
a single number representing the statistical chance
of measuring a value for the observable in a ‘similar
range’ under the zero signal hypothesis. Inferences
based on p-values should be treated with caution
(see, for example, [23] for further discussion).
3. To address the question,“What constraints do my
measurements of direct observables place on model
parameter values?” This is explicitly a Bayesian
question and, thus, requires the application of the
appropriate formalism, including the use of a prior
to define the relative context of models.
4. To objectively convey the relevant information con-
tent of the data so as to allow the impact of alter-
native assumptions to be evaluated, facilitate the
testing of different models, and permit information
from this measurement to be effectively combined
with that from other experiments. Frequentist in-
tervals are blunt instruments for this purpose that
only provide a crude simplification of likelihood in-
formation viewed through a particular, non-unique
filter that may be prone to misinterpretation. In
practice, such intervals are rarely used in the en-
semble tests for which they are relevant, being dis-
favored relative to combined analyses that either
use the raw data or likelihood maps from different
experiments. A better approach would therefore be
to actually provide, to the best extent possible, the
likelihood information directly.
The means by which to address the first two of these
issues is relatively straightforward and largely uncontro-
versial. We will therefore now concentrate on approaches
relevant for the latter two issues.
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Choice of Bayesian Priors
As indicated previously, in order to use measurements
to bound model parameter values, a context for these val-
ues must be provided in the form of a prior probability.
This conveniently permits known, physical constraints to
be imposed (e.g. energies and masses must be greater
than zero; the position of observed events must be inside
the detector, etc.) and allows known attributes of the
physical system to be taken into account (e.g. energies
are being sampled from a particular spectrum; the rel-
ative probabilities for different event classes are drawn
from a given distribution, etc.). The choice of priors in
such contexts is often non-controversial. Less straight-
forward is the case of defining a prior within the physical
region when there is no a priori knowledge of the prob-
ability distribution for a given model parameter: the so-
called “non-informative” prior. It may seem odd to need
to choose a prior at all under such circumstances, but
the fact is that “no knowledge” is a fuzzy concept whose
meaning needs to be defined.
We should note (as others have) that it is rarely the
case that there is really “no prior information” at all, as
we will generally have some knowledge of previous obser-
vations related to the current measurement. At the same
time, it is best to avoid tuning priors to previous observa-
tions in too substantive a way in order to preserve the ro-
bustness of independent verification. Typically then, the
term “non-informative” prior actually refers to a “weakly
informative” prior.
At first glance, one might think that providing an equal
weighting to all parameter values (i.e. uniform in proba-
bility) would make the most intuitive sense for the non-
informative case. However, this runs into two issues, one
trivial and one non-trivial. The trivial issue is that such
a prior is improper, not having a finite integral, and also
begs the question of whether you actually believe, for ex-
ample, that it is equally likely to detect 1010 events as it
is to detect 3. However, in practice, the prior is always
multiplied by the likelihood function, which suppresses
its impact outside of the region of interest for the actual
observation and makes the exact form of the prior far
from this region irrelevant. Thus, a uniform prior should
really be viewed as a sufficient approximation to one that
actually trails off to zero at some point in a manner that
does not need to be specifically defined. The non-trivial
issue with uniform priors is that uniformity is not nec-
essarily preserved for parameters couched in a different
form. Thus, for example, a prior distribution that is
uniform in the parameter S is not uniform in S2. This
therefore requires a choice to be made as to what form of
the model parameters might be reasonably assumed to
have a uniform prior probability distribution.
The subject of non-informative priors is one of active
discussion and debate. One common alternative is to
use a Jeffreys prior [24], which uses the Fisher informa-
tion content of the likelihood function itself to define a
non-informative prior that is transformationally invari-
ant. While this approach often works well for simple
situations, the application of this is not always straight-
forward for realistic analysis scenarios that may involve
multiple, multi-dimensional signal and background com-
ponents, often with non-parametric forms, nuisance pa-
rameters for error propagation, and multi-parameter sig-
nal models. Consequently, this can also lead to forms of
the prior that are non-intuitive and depend on the par-
ticular analysis in which it is applied.
It should be emphasized at this point that there is of-
ten no “correct” choice of prior. Making any statement
regarding the viability of a given model based on the data
necessarily requires a stated frame of reference, and the
prior just defines the context within which one chooses to
make this assessment. With this understanding in mind,
we take the pragmatic view that a non-informative prior
should be intuitively reasonable, simple to apply and vi-
sualize, and must allow for the impact of an alternative
choice of prior to be easily evaluated. To this end, we
suggest that the use of uniform priors would be preferred
and that relevant model parameters should be couched in
simple forms that make this a not unreasonable choice.
The nature of bounds on different forms can then be de-
rived from this initial determination. This approach has
the further advantage that maps of the Bayesian proba-
bility densities couched in terms of such “flat” parameters
are identical to likelihood maps, which can then serve the
important dual purpose of providing both a Bayesian as-
sessment of model viability and a detailed presentation
of the objective information content of the data.
For the purpose of consistency, it would be advanta-
geous to establish common conventions (e.g. PDG guide-
lines) for such flat parameter forms relevant to different
types of experimental measurement. Fortunately, while
the number of possible models is infinite, the basic na-
ture of fundamental parameters on which these models
depend is not, and we believe that finding agreement on a
set of reasonable choices is not a particularly contentious
issue in practice. As a general rule of thumb, our per-
ception of model parameters often falls into one of two
categories: either they are variables of magnitude, with
values spanning the same general order and for which a
uniform prior (sometimes over a limited range) may be
a reasonable choice; or they are variables of scale, poten-
tially spanning several orders of magnitude and for which
it may be appropriate to weight such scales equally, re-
sulting in a prior that is uniform in the log. These two
choices typically bound the range of non-informative pri-
ors that are generally considered to be plausible. It is,
for example, usually difficult to justify a form of non-
informative prior that actually rises with signal strength
or falls faster than would be implied by giving equal
weight to all scales. Examples of priors uniform in mag-
15
nitude might include the value of an unknown phase an-
gle, the value of a spectral index, or the precision mea-
surement of a quantity whose rough magnitude is con-
strained. Examples of priors uniform in scale might in-
clude the energy scale for new physics, the cross section
for some non-standard interaction, or first measurements
of quantities whose rough magnitude is not constrained.
A good indication of the relevant variable class can of-
ten be taken from how they are typically represented on
parameter plots (i.e. whether they have linear or loga-
rithmic scale axes).
However, for models that directly depend on a count-
ing rate measurement (especially in the region of low
event numbers), and where there is not a strong case for
another form of prior, we make the pragmatic proposal
to always use a prior proportional to a uniform average
counting rate. This is because the sensitivity range for an
experiment to detect a signal not previously established
does not typically stretch over several orders of magni-
tude and, in the event that an upper bound is appro-
priate, this prior choice produces a conservative number
for evaluating the viability of model parameter values.
In addition, as previously shown, this choice also tends
to yield a good degree of statistical coverage for simple
cases which, while not necessary for Bayesian bounds, we
regard as convenient.
Sensitivity to Prior
From Equation 1 it is clear that, for a given hypothesis,
H, and data set, D, the posterior probability is related
to the prior as follows:
log(P (H|D)) = log(P (D|H)) + log(P (H)) + C (15)
=
n∑
i=1
[
log(f(xi|H)) + 1
n
log(P (H))
]
+ C
where f is the likelihood function evaluated for each of n
independent data values x and C is a constant. Hence,
the impact of the prior probability, P (H), becomes less
significant as the number of events increase. However,
it is still the case that the choice of prior can, in some
instances, have a notable impact on the perception of
model viability. The effect becomes particularly relevant
where parameter ranges are unconstrained over orders of
magnitude and arguments hold for choosing a nominal
prior that is uniform in the log. Consequently, while the
analysis of the previous section can provide a reasonable
basis for default parameter representations and priors, in
such cases we believe it is also important to specifically
indicate the extent of the prior sensitivity. As a reason-
able and pragmatic approach, we suggest doing so by
comparing the results from the choice of a prior that is
uniform in scale with that which is uniform in the mag-
nitude of the relevant parameter. The impact can be
indicated by an additional contour on parameter maps
and, if significant, can then be further highlighted in the
data summary.
It is frequently the case that the appropriate choice be-
tween the two suggested forms of prior is clear and that
either conservative upper bounds can be derived in the
case that the data is consistent with no signal, or that the
strength of an observed signal will help to dictate robust
bounds. However, if the choice of prior is not obvious,
and if the conclusions strongly depend on the available
choice, then avoiding a Bayesian method does not alter
this fact. Using purely frequentist approaches will merely
hide the ambiguity, potentially leading to false conclu-
sions regarding the robustness of implications for model
parameter values.
When taken together, we believe that the type of ap-
proach outlined, involving: 1) a pragmatic choice of prior;
2) an explicit presentation of the likelihood; and 3) a test
of the prior sensitivity where appropriate, can provide
a robust approach for indicating Bayesian model con-
straints as an important component of the overall presen-
tation of results. In addition to helping avoid confusion in
interpretation, this would also serve the valuable purpose
(often overlooked) of explicitly indicating the strength of
information in the data and when reliable inferences re-
garding model parameter values might be made.
Unified Likelihood Maps and Data Summaries
As mentioned in the previous section, the suggestion
is to display the Bayesian posterior probability distribu-
tion in terms of model parameters with uniform priors,
which then simultaneously shows the global likelihood as
well. This probability should be suitably marginalized
over the non-essential parameters. It is sufficient to give
the ratio of the Bayesian probability (likelihood) at any
one point to the maximum value. In fact, it would seem
sensible to couch this as −2 log(L/Lmax), since this is
often approximately equivalent to differences in χ2 from
the best fit and, thus, carries some intuition. This also
readily allows for approximate frequentist intervals to be
inferred via Wilks’ Theorem, as discussed in Appendix A.
As is often done for 1-parameter models, a simple graph
of this quantity as a function of the parameter can be
shown; for a 2-parameter model, a 2D contour or color
map can be given; and for higher order models, appro-
priate sample 2D slices (preferably in the most slowly
varying parameters) can be shown.
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Bayesian credible intervals can be superimposed on top
of these plots and are simply computed by integrating
the Bayesian probability distribution (in this case equiv-
alent to the distribution of L/Lmax) in the space of these
flat parameters to find the fraction, f , of their distribu-
tion above some value L > LC . The contour defined
by that value of −2 log(LC/Lmax) then corresponds to
the credibility level CI = f . This approach also gets
around another common problem of attempting to in-
terpret the meaning of maximum likelihood contours in
terms of significance levels by either relying on Wilks’
Theorem (which, while often providing good estimates,
cannot always be relied upon for precision in the region
of low numbers of events and/or near a physical bound-
ary), or undertaking a potentially burdensome (in some
cases, perhaps intractable) Monte Carlo calculation. By
contrast, the Bayesian calculation is always well-defined
and has no such issues.
For the purposes of abstracts, text, tables etc., a con-
venient summary of results is desired. In the case of
single parameter models, the value of the parameter cor-
responding to the maximum likelihood (which is equal to
the maximum of the posterior distribution) can be quoted
along with the associated Bayesian credible interval. For
the multi-parameter case, results may be summarized by
quoting the marginalized Bayesian intervals for each pa-
rameter. As a shorthand for more detailed likelihood
shape information, especially where behavior tends to
be non-Gaussian, we suggest that bounds in terms of
flat parameters be quoted at 2 different credibility levels,
for example, 90% and 99%, or 68% (1σ) and 95% (2σ).
And, as previously discussed, for cases where the choice
between the two types of priors leads to a notably less
conservative constraint, the impact should be specifically
indicated.
Example 1: neutrino mixing
As a first example, consider the case of neutrino oscilla-
tion and mixing. Regarding the choice of non-informative
prior for ∆m2, if the scale has not been firmly established,
the value could correspond to a range of scales and is gen-
erally plotted logarithmically. Accordingly, this suggests
the choice of a prior that is uniform in the log of this
variable. If the scale has already been well established
in the field, a prior uniform in ∆m2 may be more appro-
priate (though the impact of the choice is unlikely to be
substantial in this case).
For the unknown mixing angles and phases, non-
informative priors that are uniform in circular range are
suggested. One complication here is that the form the
mixing angle takes in, for example, the 2-neutrino vac-
uum mixing expression is sin2 2θ, which means that a
given observation lead to an ambiguously defined value
of θ itself, which can be in any of 4 quadrants. Indeed,
FIG. 4: Confidence intervals derived from the SNO experi-
ment’s salt phase data [25]. The colors represent the difference
in the log of the likelihood ratio or, equivalently, differences
in the posterior probability calculated with uniform priors for
both axes, relative to the maximum point. The solid black
lines are 68%, 95%, and 99.73% Bayesian contours found by
integrating the posterior distribution. The black dashed re-
gion is the 68% credible region found under an alternative
prior that is uniform in ∆m2 rather than log(∆m2)
there is no clear consensus in the field as to the best
form to use for such experiments, with various choices
including sin2 2θ, sin2 θ and tan2 θ, making comparisons
between different results and different phenomenology
papers troublesome. While various trigonometric forms
may appear to describe different phenomena, the funda-
mental parameter is the angle itself and it therefore seems
appropriate to try to couch things in terms of this vari-
able. The issue of redundant multi-quadrant values that
may arise from measurements in some cases can be read-
ily taken into account by using variables such as |θ+npi|,
which then allows a non-redundant range in theta to rep-
resent other quadrants simultaneously.
As a more specific example of such a construction, we
use the publicly available contour map data from the 2005
SNO salt phase solar neutrino mixing parameter analy-
sis [25]. At the time of this data, the scale of ∆m212 had
not yet been unambiguously established by solar neutrino
data, so we choose a prior that is uniform in the log of
this parameter. We therefore obtain the plot in Figure
4.
The color scale represents the range of ln(L/Lmax),
while solid line contours are also shown corresponding
to Bayesian credibility levels of 68%, 95% and 99.73%.
The values of −2 ln(LC/Lmax) corresponding to these
levels were found to be 2.82, 6.58 and 12.76, respectively,
which are not so far from the naive Wilks’ expectation
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for critical ∆χ2 values corresponding to a 2D parame-
ter space (2.3, 6.1, 11.8). This suggests that frequentist
constraints would look very similar in this case. To in-
dicate the sensitivity to the choice of prior, the dashed
line contour indicates the 68% CI region if a prior that
was uniform in ∆m212 itself were used. This region is of
a very similar size to the LMA 68% contour using the
default prior that is uniform in scale, with a relatively
modest displacement of boundary positions. This indi-
cates that this range is relatively insensitive to the form
of the prior and conclusions regarding the model here are
reasonably robust. However, the LOW region would be
eliminated, suggesting that the default choice of a prior
uniform in log(∆m212) is the more conservative approach
in this case.
For the data summary, we obtain the marginalized uni-
form Bayesian intervals |θ + n(180◦)| = 33.8+2.3(4.6)−1.7(4.4) de-
grees at the 68%(95%)CI. For ∆m212, we have the inter-
esting situation that the SNO data alone cannot sepa-
rate LOW and LMA solutions at the desired credibil-
ity levels with the assumed prior, giving rise to a bi-
modal distribution in the marginalized parameter. In
this case, both possibilities should be presented using the
2-part intervals that are naturally produced by select-
ing the highest probability densities that constitute 68%
and 95% of the overall distribution, respectively. Thus,
we obtain the marginalized uniform Bayesian intervals
− log10(∆m212) = 4.3+0.1(0.25)−0.3(0.45) eV2 and 6.88+0.03(0.17)−0.03(0.23) eV2
at the 68%(95%)CI.
Example 2: rare event search
Unfortunately, it is not a common enough practice for
experiments to provide detailed likelihood information.
Consequently, to provide an example of an analysis oper-
ating in a much more restricted range of event numbers,
we will consider a hypothetical experiment generically
searching for rare events. For simplicity, we will assume
this to be a counting experiment with negligible system-
atic uncertainties and a well-defined background expec-
tation, along the lines of the examples considered earlier
in this document.
Assume that the expected background is B = 5 events
in the region of interest and that 10 events are observed.
We then wish to place 90% CI upper bounds on the aver-
age signal strength, S. In accordance with previous dis-
cussion, as this measurement relates to a low-rate count-
ing experiment, we choose a prior that is uniform in S.
We would therefore use the Poisson likelihood function
from Equation 2 with B = 5 to plot −2 ln(L/Lmax) as a
function of S, as shown in Figure 5.
Even for such a simple measurement, the likelihood
function will typically not, in fact, be a simple Poisson
distribution owing to an imperfect knowledge of the ex-
FIG. 5: Difference in log likelihood from the best-fit signal
strength, as a function of signal strength, for a Poisson pro-
cess with background rate B = 5 where 10 events are ob-
served. The vertical lines represent Bayesian upper limits
at the stated confidence levels, while the intersections of the
dashed horizontal line with the curve indicates the 90% CL
two-sided limits from Wilks’ Theorem.
pected background and systematic uncertainties, the ef-
fects of which must be taken into account by an appro-
priate marginalization of the distribution.
The Bayesian uniform prior upper bounds are indi-
cated on the plot for 90%, 95% and 99% CI. As the al-
ternative choice of a prior uniform in log(S) would result
in a smaller value for the bound (e.g. S < 7.35 at 90%
CI), it is not necessary to show the impact of this alter-
nate choice since the chosen prior represents the conser-
vative value. Thus, we may simply quote the Bayesian
uniform prior upper bounds on S as 10.4(15.2) at the
90%(99%) CI.
The dashed line also shown on the plot corresponds
to an approximate frequentist 90% CL based on Wilks’
theorem, and suggests that an interval would be called
for under a unified approach spanning 0.66-11.1 (compa-
rable to the corresponding Feldman-Cousins interval of
1.2-11.5). Hence, for this case, frequentist numbers are
reasonably similar to those from the Bayesian approach,
with the slight difference at the upper end largely due to
the choice to quote a 1-sided versus a 2-sided bound.
If we instead considered the scenario described earlier
where B = 9 and 5 events are observed, the likelihood
plot shown in Figure 6 is instead produced.
In this case, as previously described, the Bayesian up-
per bound is 3.88, while the frequentist bound inferred
from Wilks’ theorem is only 2.64 (slightly more conser-
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FIG. 6: Difference in log likelihood between the best-fit sig-
nal strength, as a function of signal strength, for a Poisson
process with background rate B = 9 where 5 events are ob-
served. The vertical lines represent Bayesian upper limits
at the stated credibility levels, while the intersections of the
dashed horizontal line with the curve indicate the two-sided
90% CL limits from Wilks’ Theorem.
vative than the Feldman-Cousins bound of 2.38 for this
scenario). This is an example where frequentist bounds
are misleadingly foreshortened as a result of negative fluc-
tuations and prone to misinterpretation.
CONCLUSION
The distillation of constraints on theoretical model pa-
rameter values is central to scientific enquiry and rep-
resents the ultimate goal of experimental observations.
There is therefore an understandable desire to interpret
the probable nature of such constraints as well as to de-
fine the objective details of experimental observations,
even when the available information content of the data
is necessarily limited. A failure to recognize both aspects
and clearly represent them with distinct and appropri-
ate formalisms inevitably leads to misinterpretation and
misuse of quoted confidence intervals.
Frequentist confidence intervals, even “sophisticated”
implementations such as Feldman-Cousins, generally suf-
fer from significant shortcomings in this regard:
• They do not reliably indicate the relevance of indi-
vidual measurements.
• They are prone to frequent misinterpretation that
can result in incorrect conclusions and seemingly
paradoxical behaviors.
• They do not provide a robust basis for the compar-
ison of different experimental results.
• There is no self-consistent approach to propagate
systematic uncertainties.
• There is no self-consistent method for producing
a lower-dimensional confidence interval with a de-
sired statistical coverage from a higher-dimensional
interval.
• They do not possess a unique definition and repre-
sent a very limited view of the underlying likelihood
information.
Furthermore, frequentist intervals are rarely, if ever, ac-
tually used for the purpose in which their context is
meaningfully defined: constraining model parameter val-
ues at the designated confidence level with a large ensem-
ble of similar measurements. Even where multiple mea-
surements exist, the practice is generally to undertake a
combined analysis with either the raw measurements or
likelihood maps from individual experiments rather than
to compare frequentist intervals. As such, the relevance
of quoting intervals that are never actually used for their
intended purpose (and, in fact, are readily abandoned
with the addition of further data) is questionable. As far
as objectively conveying the information content of the
data, we therefore believe that providing the likelihood
itself as a function of relevant model parameters offers
the clearest and most useful approach.
Bayesian credible intervals offer the only well-defined
mathematical approach to placing bounds on model pa-
rameter values themselves and, thus, are a necessary
component of data presentation if one is to address this
aspect. Bayesian intervals are generally free from many
of the problems that plague frequentist intervals, but suf-
fer from the one issue of requiring the specification of a
prior to establish the context of the model. However, we
argue here that
1. For Poisson statistics in particular, the use of a
prior that is uniform in the counting rate produces
conservative upper bounds and offers a pragmati-
cally defensible choice for bounding model parame-
ter values. (Appendix A shows that these credible
intervals also have reasonable frequentist coverage
for simple cases.)
2. In other areas, the forms for priors are effectively
bounded between those that are uniform in magni-
tude and those that are uniform in scale (i.e. equal
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weighting in the log), where the appropriate choice
between these two alternatives for a given parame-
ter class is usually obvious.
3. When appropriate, explicit indications of the sen-
sitivity to this choice of prior can easily be shown,
which provides additional valuable details regard-
ing the strength of information contained in the
data that is otherwise hidden (rather than avoided)
by pure frequentist methods.
Taken together, we believe this provides a clear and ro-
bust approach to the presentation of model constraints.
Achieving a community consensus on such an approach
for Bayesian intervals seems both straightforward and of
more practical benefit than continuing to only use fre-
quentist constructions which are, themselves, arbitrary
and prone to the numerous difficulties previously listed.
We also recommend that the global likelihood for data
sets be shown as a function of ‘flat’ Bayesian model pa-
rameters to simultaneously indicate the Bayesian poste-
rior probability distribution and objectively represent the
relevant information content of the data. Such represen-
tations allow other analysts to more optimally combine
information from other experiments and test models un-
der different assumptions. Bayesian credibility levels can
be readily indicated on such plots and approximate fre-
quentist intervals can also generally be extracted if de-
sired by appealing to Wilks’ Theorem (which is found to
work well for Poisson statistics, even for small numbers
of events).
As previously indicated, we believe the standardiza-
tion of priors is straightforward and no more arbitrary
than choosing any other type of interval construction.
For data summaries, we therefore recommend quoting
Bayesian credibility bounds in terms of common flat
parameter forms, marginalizing where appropriate for
multi-dimensional parameter spaces. As a shorthand for
more detailed likelihood/Bayesian shape information, we
also suggest that, where convenient, such bounds are
quoted at two different credibility levels, such as 90%
and 99%, or 68% and 95%.
Overall, we believe this to represent a much more well-
balanced approach to the presentation of experimental
results that offers a higher degree of relevance and trans-
parency than purely frequentist conventions, while still
providing objective information about the measurement
in a more useful form.
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APPENDIX A: COVERAGE AND CONSISTENCY
Frequentist Coverage
Central to the frequentist paradigm is the concept of
statistical coverage: that limits derived from an ensemble
of repeated experiments would correctly bound the true
model a known fraction of the time. This is a hypotheti-
cal construction, independent of the prospect for actually
achieving a large enough ensemble of measurements to re-
liably bound a model with the relevant accuracy this way.
Indeed, as there is no clear criteria for when an ensemble
is large enough for frequentist intervals to ever be used
to constrain model parameter values, nor how this could
even be done in principle outside of ultimately employing
Bayesian statistics, the construction is hypothetical even
where there is a large ensemble of measurements.
In this context, the necessity to produce precise fre-
quentist bounds can seem a little unclear. In fact, as
discussed in Section , achieving exact coverage is often
not actually possible in the presence of systematic uncer-
tainties, and is not possible for counting statistics even
without such uncertainties, since the quantized nature of
measurements inevitably leads to coverages that are ei-
ther a little greater than the target confidence level (over-
coverage) or less than this target (under-coverage). The
former of these is generally chosen to insure coverage in
excess of the target confidence level (though one might
pragmatically argue that such intervals need only be de-
termined to an accuracy comparable to that with which
they will ever actually be used to bound a model). Con-
sequently, it is possible to spend large amounts of CPU
time computing Feldman-Cousins intervals in which the
achieved precision does not reflect the achieved accuracy.
The coverage map for the Neyman construction of 90%
CL intervals using the Feldman-Cousins ordering rule is
shown in Figure 7 for Poisson statistics in the region of
low counts. This figure plots the frequency with which
the true model parameter value lies outside of the de-
rived bounds and indicates the extent and distribution
of the inherent over-coverage. This assumes a perfect
knowledge of the background level, no systematic uncer-
tainties, etc. Here the over-coverage, which can be as
large as a few percent for certain values of the signal and
background rates, is due entirely to the discrete nature
of Poisson counting statistics.
While the Neyman construction permits the most con-
trolled definition of frequentist intervals, it is also often
usefully the case that approximate frequentist intervals
can be much more easily derived from the global likeli-
hood itself by appealing to Wilks’ Theorem, which says
that, in the large n limit, −2 logLR is distributed as a
χ2d distribution, where LR is the likelihood ratio between
nested hypotheses defined by d model parameters. In
fact, this works surprisingly well for Poisson statistics,
FIG. 7: Fraction of time with which a Feldman-Cousins 90%
confidence interval generated from Poisson observations does
not contain the true signal rate, as a function of the true signal
rate and the background rate (which is assumed to be known
perfectly). The over-coverage of a few percent is intrinsic to
the discrete nature of the observable.
even for small numbers of counts (as might be implied
by the fact that the Bartlett correction for this case is
estimated to be small [16]). The corresponding coverage
map for this is shown in Figure 8, where a χ2 threshold
of 2.706 is used for −2 log(L/Lbest) to define a 2-sided
90% CL interval similar to Feldman-Cousins, with Lbest
evaluated for non-negative values of S (which leads to the
over-coverage seen on the left side of the plot). A very
good approximation to 90% coverage is achieved and, in
fact, for most of the plane, the magnitude of the devia-
tion from exact coverage is no larger than that seen in
the Feldman-Cousins case of Figure 7. If desired, the
areas of slight under-coverage can be all but eliminated
to achieve more conservative bounds by simply choosing
slightly higher threshold values for the likelihood ratio.
Conveniently, the accuracy with which Wilks’ theorem
approximates the coverage suggests that reasonable es-
timates of frequentist intervals can often be given, even
for small statistics, by simply providing the global like-
lihood as a function of relevant model parameters with-
out resorting to the computationally intensive Feldman-
Cousins construction. In cases where the applicability of
Wilks’ theorem may be more questionable, Monte Carlo
simulations can be used to spot-check the implied cover-
age in the region of interest.
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FIG. 8: Fraction of time with which 90% confidence intervals
generated by Wilks’ theorem for a Poisson observation do not
contain the true signal rate, as a function of the true signal
rate and the background rate (which is assumed to be known
perfectly). The magnitude of deviations from the expected
coverage are comparable to the Feldman-Cousins case.
Bayesian Consistency
Bayesian credibility levels represent the degree of be-
lief that the limits derived from a particular observation
actually bound the true value of the model parameter.
Unlike frequentist intervals, the extent of Bayesian inter-
vals are intended to directly represent the probable range
of the model parameter. To make this concept tangible in
the sense of calculation, we define “Bayesian consistency”
as the notion that, if possible model parameter values
were sampled according to the assumed prior distribu-
tion and instances were selected where an experimental
measurement would result in exactly what was observed,
then the derived credible intervals correctly bound the
true model in the desired fraction of these cases. And,
indeed, correctly constructed Bayesian intervals are al-
ways exact in this sense for the assumed paradigm, even
for the case of Poisson statistics. As such, unlike fre-
quentist coverage, maps of Bayesian consistency are not
necessary. It is also perhaps worth noting that, since
Bayesian credible intervals are specific to each particular
measurement and have a meaning that is independent
of any ensemble, the choice of interval type (e.g.“flip-
flopping,” as discussed in Section ) has no impact at all
on Bayesian consistency.
Some Unfair Comparisons
While never intended for this purpose, it is nevertheless
of interest to explore the extent to which Bayesian con-
FIG. 9: Fraction of time with which 90% CI Bayesian upper
bounds generated with Bayes theorem and a uniform prior
for a Poisson observation, and then treated as a CL, do not
contain the true signal rate, as a function of the true signal
rate and the background rate. There is over-coverage, which
implies that the Bayesian intervals are more conservative than
Neyman-constructed intervals for this choice of prior.
structions also provide statistical coverage. In particular,
we will explore the case in which a uniform prior in signal
rate is used for a simple, 1-D Poisson observable. Results
are shown in Figure 9 for Bayesian upper bounds. As can
be seen, these bounds tend to over-cover. In other words,
for an ensemble of repeated experiments, upper bounds
constructed using this Bayesian prescription will tend to
contain the true model value with a higher frequency
than, for example, Feldman-Cousins bounds. Therefore,
at least for upper bounds on counting statistics (which is
also relevant to estimates of experimental sensitivities),
this prescription is conservative and sufficient for both
definitions of coverage.
For 2-sided interval constructions, the coverage is mod-
ified, as shown in Figure 10. Reasonable statistical cov-
erage is generally achieved in this case as well, although
there is some under-coverage in the region corresponding
to borderline signal detections. For such cases, the 90%
CI Bayesian bounds provide statistical coverage at the
level of 86% or more if treated as a frequentist CL.
Correspondingly, it is also of interest to explore the
extent to which frequentist constructions also provide
Bayesian consistency for this same case. Figure 11 shows
this for the Feldman-Cousins method and indicates the
probability for the true model parameter value to lie out-
side of the derived bounds for a given measurement, as-
suming that all signal strengths are equally likely. This
plot has a very different interpretation from Figures 7-10:
it indicates what fraction of true values of the signal rate
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are not contained in the Feldman-Cousins interval for a
particular observed number of counts, where each model
value is given equal weight in its assigned prior proba-
bility. Here, the frequentist CL value, treated as a CI,
can significantly overestimate the credibility for down-
ward fluctuations in the observed rate. The entire up-
per left portion of the plot represents cases where the
Feldman-Cousins intervals very often do not contain the
true signal rate. This again highlights the fact that fre-
quentist intervals only yield correct statistical coverage
as an ensemble average. However, for particular obser-
vations, the constructed interval can often be quite un-
likely to contain the true value of the parameter. While
some sections of the upper left region of this plot repre-
sent unlikely fluctuations, there is a reasonable fraction
of phase space where this is not the case. In fact, as the
average signal strength approaches zero, the frequency
with which overestimation of credibility levels occurs ap-
proaches 50%, with significant overestimation occurring
in more than 10% of cases. This gives rise to many of
the apparent paradoxes previously described when fre-
quentist intervals are misinterpreted as providing betting
odds for parameter values. Hence, while the Bayesian
construction described here also typically provides rea-
sonable frequentist coverage, frequentist bounds do not
generally provide good estimates of Bayesian credibility.
It may be objected that these conclusions are based on
a particular choice of prior and that details will change
for other choices. Nevertheless, it is true to say that
frequentist intervals will generally not provide adequate
Bayesian credibility estimates for other common prior
choices either. At the same time, while the situation be-
comes more complicated with multiple dimensions, this
example demonstrates it is possible to make a pragmatic
choice of a commonly used prior for Bayesian intervals
that will also provide a reasonable level of frequentist cov-
erage for the case of a simple Poisson observable. While
such coverage is in no way required for Bayesian inter-
vals, we regard this property for the simple Poisson case
as convenient.
FIG. 10: Fraction of time with which two-sided 90% Bayesian
credible intervals generated with Bayes theorem and a uni-
form prior for a Poisson observation do not contain the true
signal rate, as a function of the true signal rate and the back-
ground rate. There is mild over-coverage or under-coverage,
with deviations from the exact coverage of approximately the
same size as those seen for Feldman-Cousins intervals.
FIG. 11: Probability that a 90% CL Feldman-Cousins interval
excludes the true mean signal rate given a particular observed
number of counts and expected background rate, where the
probability is an average over equally weighted values of the
mean signal rate.
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APPENDIX B: MAXIMIZATION VERSUS
INTEGRATION OVER NUISANCE
PARAMETERS
A point that is sometimes a source of confusion is that
the Bayesian and frequentist approaches for incorporat-
ing the effect of nuisance parameters are often differ-
ent. Given a joint likelihood distribution L(θ, ξ), a 1D
Bayesian probability distribution for θ, assuming a uni-
form prior pi(ξ) for ξ, is given by:
P (θ) ∝
∫
dξL(θ, ξ)pi(ξ) ∝
∫
dξL(θ, ξ) ≡ Lmarg(θ)
(16)
where we may refer to Lmarg(θ) as the “marginalized
likelihood” obtained from integrating L(θ, ξ) with a flat
prior for ξ. (Strictly speaking Lmarg(θ) is not a likelihood
function but a posterior distribution, but since it plays
an analogous role in Bayesian analyses to the frequentist
profiled likelihood the notation Lmarg is useful.) In con-
trast, the frequentist approach to eliminating a nuisance
parameter is often to instead “profile” the likelihood:
Lprof (θ) = max
ξ
L(θ, ξ) (17)
It is not necessarily intuitive how these seemingly differ-
ent methods are related, if at all.
In fact, the marginalization by integration given in
Equation 16 is the more fundamental method, and fol-
lows directly from the laws of conditional probability. It
is not often appreciated that the “profiling” method is
actually just a numerical approximation to the full inte-
gration. This approximation, proposed by Laplace [22],
can be derived by rewriting Equation 16:
Lmarg(θ) =
∫
dξL(θ, ξ) =
∫
dξ exp(lnL(θ, ξ)). (18)
For fixed θ, one then proceeds by finding the maximum
of lnL as a function of ξ and doing a Taylor expansion
around the value ξˆθ that maximizes lnL(θ, ξ):
Lmarg(θ) ≈ (19)
∫
dξ exp
(
lnL(θ, ξˆθ)− 1
2
∣∣∣∣d2(lnL(θ, ξ))dξ2
∣∣∣∣
ξˆθ
(ξ − ξˆθ)2
)
To the extent that higher order terms can be neglected,
this integral evaluates to:
Lmarg(θ) ∝
√√√√ 1∣∣∣d2(lnL(θ,ξ)dξ2 ∣∣∣
ξˆθ
exp
(
lnL(θ, ξˆθ)
)
(20)
This is nothing other than Lprof times a correction fac-
tor which depends on the second derivative of the likeli-
hood function. If the likelihood function is Gaussian, the
correction factor is a constant and so the approximation
is exact, and if the likelihood function is only approx-
imately Gaussian, then its second derivative still only
varies slowly with θ. Expressed more simply in terms of
the log likelihood, we have:
− lnLmarg(θ) ≈ (21)
− lnLprof (θ) + 1
2
ln
(∣∣∣∣d2(lnL(θ, ξ)dξ2
∣∣∣∣
ξˆθ
)
Hence, we see that the frequentist’s method of eliminat-
ing nuisance parameters by maximizing the likelihood as
a function of the unwanted parameter is actually just an
approximation to integrating over the parameter in the
case that the joint likelihood is Gaussian. Furthermore,
Equation 21 gives us a correction factor to this approx-
imation that can improve the accuracy in the case that
the likelihood is not exactly Gaussian.
To the extent that the likelihood function is well-
approximated by a multi-dimensional Gaussian, even a
Bayesian analysis may find the multi-dimensional gener-
alisation of Equation 21 a useful numerical expedient to
replace a potentially complicated integral with a function
minimization and the evaluation of the second derivatives
of lnL at that minimum.
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APPENDIX C: MAXIMUM SIZE OF
FREQUENTISTS ”FLIP-FLOP” EFFECT
The “flip-flop” effect is a phenomenon that only im-
pacts frequentist intervals and can occur when differ-
ent experimenters choose for themselves when to quote
a given type of interval based on the result, leading to
a small statistical bias in frequentist coverage. To es-
timate the maximum size of the effect, consider a signal
with a strength corresponding to an average detected sig-
nificance level that is just at the threshold for an exper-
imenter to rule out the zero signal hypothesis. Accord-
ingly, about half the time, a fluctuation will take place
in the positive direction that will result in a claimed de-
tection and a 2-sided CL interval. In this case, since the
observed rate is larger than the true average signal rate,
a large enough upwards fluctuation can result in an inter-
val with a lower limit larger than the average rate, which
would then incorrectly exclude this value. For a sym-
metric confidence interval, the frequency with which such
values are nominally excluded in the lower half of the dis-
tribution is 12 (1−CL)/0.5 = 1−CL (normalizing for only
the lower half). However, when a negative fluctuation oc-
curs, the significance drops below threshold and a 1-sided
upper limit is set. The average signal is now larger than
implied by the observed number of events, and risks be-
ing excluded at the upper end. The frequency with which
signals are nominally excluded in the upper half of such a
1-sided distribution is (1−CL)/0.5 = 2(1−CL). There-
fore, the total exclusion frequency for positive and nega-
tive fluctuations is 12 (1−CL)+ 12 [2(1−CL)] = 32 (1−CL).
Thus, the maximum effect would mean that a 90% CL
only has 85% coverage, and a 99% CL only has 98.5%
coverage.
